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On the Optimality of Delegating
Pricing Authority to the Sales Force
An important decision facing sales managers today is precisely how much pricing authority should be delegated to
the sales force. Received theory suggests that the salesperson's superior information about customers' valuations
will invariably make price delegation profitable for the firm. The empirical evidence, however, reveals that firms that
grant full pricing authority generate lower profits than firms that limit pricing authority. Given this state of affairs, the
author develops and analyzes a formal model that examines the optimality of delegating pricing authority to the
sales force. The model preserves the notion of superior information assumed in the literature but considers as well
a negative feature of much concern to practitioners, namely, the suboptimal substitution of selling effort by price
discounting. The model reveals that providing the salesperson with full pricing authority is not always optimal.
Specifically, in some environments, it is appropriate to limit pricing authority because this decision forces the sales-
person to target high-valuation customers. In addition, the model predicts that the commission rate offered to the
salesperson should be higher when pricing authority is fimited. The author concludes by summarizing the context,
calculus, and implications of the model with a view to assisting managers charged with the price-delegatiori
decision.
An important decision facing sales managers today isprecisely how much pricing authority should be del-egated to the sales force. Dolan and Simon (1996)
report that firms vary widely in this regard. Some give full
pricing authority to their salespeople, whereas others grant
only limited authority. Not surprisingly, the question of dele-
gating pricing authority to the sales force has been examined
in the marketing literature before (Lai 1986; Weinberg 1975).
The main conclusion emerging from these studies is that as
long as the incentives are properly aligned (i.e., based on
gross margins and not on sales), the salesperson's superior
knowledge about customers' valuations of the firm's offering
will invariably make price delegation profitable for the firm.
Given these theoretical arguments in favor of delegating
pricing authority to the sales force, Stephenson, Cron, and
Frazier (1979) set out to investigate empirically the profit
implications of price delegation. Consistent with theory,
they focus their research efforts on an industry in which
commissions are based on gross margins. In their analysis,
responding firms are categorized into three groups: those
providing their salespeople with no authority to deviate
from list price, those allowing a specific percentage devia-
tion from list price, and those granting full discretion with
respect to pricing. Surprisingly, they find that firms that give
salespeople the least pricing authority generate the highest
levels of gross margin. A similar pattern of findings holds
for the level of net profit (gross margin less salesperson
compensation) enjoyed by the firm. Thus, Stephenson,
Cron, and Frazier's empirical findings do not support the
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theoretical prescription that favors a high degree of price
delegation.
Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier (1979) conclude by
emphasizing the need for additional research that examines
the optimality of delegating pricing authority to the sales
force. They identify five factors that can mitigate, or even
reverse, the optimality of delegating pricing authority to the
sales force. These factors, listed in order, are (1) the kind of
sales behaviors that evolve when sales personnel are given
pricing latitude, (2) the amount of superior information
salespeople have about customer willingness to pay, (3) the
nature of competitive behavior occurring under price dele-
gation, (4) buyers' bargaining ability and behavior under
price delegation (i.e., negotiation issues), and (5) control
value of gross-margin commission systems.
In this article, I develop and analyze a theoretical model
that explicitly incorporates two of the five factors high-
lighted by Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier. On the one hand,
providing pricing authority to individual salespeople enables
them to use their superior information about customer will-
ingness to pay and thereby conclude a greater number of
transactions. On the other hand, providing salespeople with
pricing authority leads to the possibility of suboptimal trade-
offs between price and effort. In this connection, it is inter-
esting to note that sales managers often complain that price
latitude causes sales personnel to take the path of least resis-
tance, that is, use discounting rather than expend effort on
selling (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979, p. 26). Given
these opposing considerations, my primary objective in this
research is to examine the net effect of these two forces in
influencing the price-delegation decision.
The limited focus of the present research does not imply
that the other factors identified by Stephenson, Cron, and
Frazier are unimportant. Rather, this narrow focus is
designed to offer a sharp understanding of how two oppos-
ing considerations influence the optimality of the price-
62 / Journal of Marketing, January 2001
Journal of Marketing
Vol. 65 (January 2001), 62-70
delegation decision. Indeed, such an approach is consistent
with what Moorthy (1993) observes about the nature and
role of theoretical modeling. While commenting that theo-
retical modeling has rapidly become an important style of
research in marketing, he writes that real-world situations
are incredibly complex. Many forces come into play, and
what we observe as managerial actions are the results of all
these forces. As such, inferring cause and effect from
observed actions can be a daunting task. Consequently, by
analyzing a limited aspect of reality, theoretical modeling
enables an understanding of the specific effect of a force or
a subset of forces.
In addition to analyzing the impact of two key forces,
the model also helps shed light on a managerially relevant
question: Does the extent of pricing authority affect the level
of incentives offered to the salesperson? Specifically, should
a firm contemplating a reduction in pricing authority
increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the commission rate
offered to the salesperson?
The main analytical findings are as follows: There are
regions in the parameter space in which full price delegation
is the most favorable course of action and others in which
limiting pricing authority is the best strategy. This is an
important conclusion because it provides a basis for recon-
ciling the confiicting empirical evidence presented in the lit-
erature. In addition, the commission rate should be higher at
firms that limit pricing authority. This finding suggests that
firms making the transition from full pricing to limited pric-
ing authority also need to increase the emphasis placed on
incentive pay. This finding is noteworthy because intuition
would suggest that placing greater limits on pricing might
be accompanied by relaxing the emphasis placed on another
control element, namely, the commission rate.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: I first
review the relevant literature. This overview is followed by
a description of the essential features of my research setting.
Next, I present the impact and resolution of the two oppos-
ing forces within the model. Finally, I present the main
results in the form of two propositions and conclude by out-
lining how the model may be used to assist managers
charged with the price-delegation decision.
Literature Review
Dolan and Simon (1996) succinctly delineate the arguments
for and against delegating pricing authority to the sales
force. An argument for price delegation is that, in general,
the salesperson is in the best position to assess customer
willingness to pay. Consequently, delegating pricing author-
ity to the salesperson achieves optimal customization of
prices. Moreover, if the salesperson's compensation is based
on gross margins rather than sales revenue, the objectives of
the firm and the salesperson are identical; therefore, given
the better knowledge of the customer, the salesperson
should be given a good measure of pricing authority.
This line of reasoning has been formally developed by
Weinberg (1975) and, more recently, Lai (1986). Specifi-
cally, Lai demonstrates that price delegation will be more
profitable than centralization under conditions of asymmet-
ric demand information. However, in his model, price dele-
gation comes at a cost, in that the firm must pay salespeople
a compensation premium (information rent) to motivate
them to vary prices appropriately for different customers.
Thus, the profitability of price delegation depends on
whether the gains from price customization exceed the
informational rents that need to be paid to the salespeople.
Dolan and Simon (1996) also present arguments against
price delegation. They suggest that providing pricing
authority to salespeople may make them too compliant in
the negotiating situation. In other words, "there is the temp-
tation to always play it safe to get the order" (Dolan and
Simon 1996, p. 313). This line of reasoning has been for-
mally examined by Berger (1972) and Weinberg (1975).
Their research suggests that price delegation will be less
profitable if the salesperson is risk averse. Another argument
against price delegation is that it enables buyers to negotiate
better prices. As an old purchasing axiom states, "Find out if
the salesperson can reduce the price. If he can, insist that he
do so" (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979, p. 27).
These explanations certainly enhance the understanding
of the optimality of the price-delegation decision. Many of
the practitioner comments can be evaluated in the context of
formal models. For example, salespeople's ability to use their
superior information is captured in Lai's (1986) model. Sim-
ilarly, the observation that risk aversion may cause salespeo-
ple to discount suboptimally is suggested by Berger (1972)
and Weinberg (1975). However, the issue of a suboptimal
trade-off between effort and price has not been explicitly
examined in the literature before. Therefore, I next develop a
formal model that explicitly incorporates this trade-off.
Research Setting
The basic framework used in this study is in the tradition of
decision-theoretic research on sales force compensation
(Srinivasan 1981). In developing the features of my research
setting, I am guided by two considerations. First, I rely on the
simplest model that enables me to study the impact of the two
forces I consider. Second, I use control mechanisms com-
monly employed in the practice of sales force management.
Nature of Price Delegation
As is revealed in previous research, price delegation is not a
binary decision variable; firms typically offer varying levels
of price latitude. These levels include no pricing authority,
limited pricing authority, and full pricing authority. Because
no pricing authority is a rigid condition, it is unlikely to be
the optimal strategy in any market with a reasonable amount
of diversity in customer willingness to pay. Therefore, in my
research, I exclude this strategy and focus on the other two
cases. Under limited pricing authority, price latitude is con-
fined to a prespecified percentage of the list price or
bounded by a price fioor. In this scenario, both the price
floor and the commission rate infiuence the salesperson's
actions. Under full pricing authority, the salesperson has
complete freedom to set any price above cost (assumed,
without loss of generality, to be zero in the ensuing analy-
sis), the only control being the commission rate. These two
pricing policies are likely to encapsulate the practice of most
firms in any given industry. In Stephenson, Cron, and Fra-
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zier's (1979) sample, for example, these two policies
describe the practices of 72% of the firms in the hospital
supplies industry.
Structure of the Market
The market consists of two segments, A and B (see Figure
1). Customers in these segments buy either one unit of the
firm's offering or nothing. Furthermore, customers in Seg-
ment A have reservation values for the product that are
independently distributed and come from the uniform distri-
bution [1 - 5, 2 - 5], 5 > 0. (I discuss the significance of the
parameter, 8, subsequently.) Although these customers have
positive economic value for the product, they have no pre-
vious awareness of its existence. Thus, they will purchase
the firm's offering only if a salesperson contacts them and
familiarizes them with the features of the product.
Segment B consists of customers who value the product
to a lesser extent. Customers in this segment have reserva-
tion values that are independently distributed and come
from the uniform distribution [0, 1]. Again, although these
people have positive economic value for the firm's offering,
they will make a purchase only if a salesperson contacts
them and familiarizes them with the features of the product.
Finally, I assume that the firm views Segment A as its
target segment. In essence, the role of the salesperson is to
identify customers who value the product highly and pro-
mote it to them.' However, as can be expected, there is some
overlap between the two segments. In particular, there are
some customers in both segments whose valuations lie in
the interval [1 - 8, 1]. The parameter 8 is thus a measure of
overlap between the two segments. It is reasonable to expect
that its value will be greater than 0 but significantly less than
1. Of course, the firm is concerned primarily about the price
obtained for the product; it is less concerned whether a par-
ticular customer belongs to Segment A or B. Nevertheless,
given that customers in Segment A tend to have higher
reservation values, the firm necessarily will encourage the
salesperson to identify and pursue customers belonging to
Segment A.
Conceptualization of the Seiling Function
I conceptualize the selling function as consisting of two
tasks, namely, prospecting and face-to-face communication.
'Indeed, sales organizations today are becoming increasingly
concerned about targeting profitable customers. Specifically, in
many industries, sales managers are encouraging salespeople to
profile and target high-margin customers (Rasmusson 1999).
Prospecting consists of identifying customers who belong to
the firm's target segment. Face-to-face communication con-
sists of familiarizing the customer with product features.
Although both activities are necessary components of the
sales process, I view prospecting as the central task. Face-
to-face communication, though important, simply follows as
a matter of course after the potential customer has been
identified. Such an abstraction of the selling process is con-
sistent with the views expressed in textbooks on profes-
sional selling. Weitz, Castlebury, and Tanner (1998, p. 186),
for example, write, "Many experts note that prospecting is
the most important activity that a salesperson does." Fur-
thermore, other aspects of the sales process, such as han-
dling price objections, may never arise if the right customer
is contacted.
Accordingly, although the selling function is character-
ized by two tasks, only the effort associated with prospecting
plays an active role. The effort associated with face-to-face
communication is included only for logical completeness. A
little thought will show that this is not too stringent an
assumption. After effort has been expended in gaining an
audience with the prospect, it is in the salesperson's best
interest to do the best job of face-to-face communication.
Next, I specify that the effort expended by the salesper-
son on prospecting is unobservable to the firm (or to the
sales manager acting on behalf of the firm). However,
through a quick perusal of the salesperson's call report, the
firm can monitor the number of prospects contacted.
Accordingly, the firm sets a target that the salesperson will
call on N prospects during a given period.2 As mentioned
previously, after the salesperson has called on a prospect, he
or she simply familiarizes the customer with the features of
the product in face-to-face communication. Clearly, in many
real-world situations, face-to-face communication may also
involve negotiating and boosting willingness to pay. These
dynamics, though important, are outside the scope of the
model.
Prospecting Technology
Given the aforementioned conceptualization of the selling
function, the primary role of the salesperson is to identify
target customers. The prospecting technology employed by
the salesperson has the following features. Specifically, I
assume that there is a large vector of variables, Z, that can
help the salesperson identify customers who belong to Seg-
ment A. As outlined by Shapiro and Bonoma (1984), these
variables may include demographic as well as situational
factors. Moreover, as in discriminant analysis, the ability of
these variables to correctly identify Segment A customers
occurs with some error. However, the more variables, z, in
Z that are used to screen a customer, the greater is the prob-
ability, (]), that the customer belongs to Segment A. The para-
meter (j) therefore may be interpreted as a measure of the
quality of the prospecting strategy.
2This is a fairly typical way to monitor salesperson effort.
Churchill, Ford, and Walker (1997, pp. 224-25), for example, doc-
ument that sales organizations frequently use activity quotas that
specify the number of calls that the salesperson should make on
new accounts.
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I now posit a simple linear relationship between the
number of screening variables used, z, and the quality of the
prospecting strategy, ([). In other words, the parameters z and
(|) are interchangeable, except for a scaling parameter. The
important notion of diminishing returns is introduced on the
costs side, as described subsequently. This type of modeling
has precedent in the sales force compensation literature, in
which the notion of diminishing returns is captured by a lin-
ear response function and a quadratic cost function (see,
e.g., the model formulations in Lai and Srinivasan [1993]
and Joseph and Thevaranjan [1998]).
Cost of Prospecting
I next specify that the salesperson incurs a fixed cost, T, in
interacting with a potential prospect. This cost may be
thought of as the effort associated with initiating a precall
interaction (letter, telephone call, and the like). Upon com-
pleting this interaction, the salesperson receives information
that enables the customer to be described fully in terms of
the vector Z.
In this scenario, the salesperson's decision variable is to
choose the number of screening variables, z. As mentioned
previously, this decision directly affects the quality of the
prospecting strategy, (]). Moreover, the greater the number of
screening variables used, the larger is the number of cus-
tomers the salesperson must contact and profile before find-
ing one that is acceptable. I now specify a convex relation-
ship between the number of customers to be contacted and
the number of screening variables used. In other words, cus-
tomers surviving screening become increasingly scarce as
more and more screening variables are used. Mathemati-
cally, this convex relationship may be expressed by the qua-
dratic expression y z ,̂ or equivalently, y <[)-. The parameter y
represents a scaling parameter and is likely to be inversely
related to the proportion of Segment A customers in the mar-
ket. The cost of identifying a single prospect, C(l), using a
prospecting strategy with quality (^ may now be written as
(la) C( I) = X y ())2.
Next, making the reasonable assumption that the size of
the market is large relative to N, the same cost structure
holds for identifying each additional customer. Thus, the
cost of identifying N prospects using a prospecting strategy
of quality (|) is given as
(lb)
Replacing y t by a new parameter, X/2, Equation lb can be
rewritten as
(lc) C(N) = N-(
The 1/2 is introduced simply to reduce clutter in future equa-
tions. Accordingly, X/2 may be interpreted straightforwardly
as the cost of effort associated with identifying a single
prospect using a high-quality prospecting strategy (<|) = 1). It
is convenient to call X the effort cost of following a high-qual-
ity prospecting strategy. It has the intuitively appealing prop-
erty of being infiuenced by both market conditions (note that
the fraction of customers who belong to Segment A affects y)
and a sales process variable (cost of precall interaction, x).
Given this prospecting technology, the quality of the
prospecting strategy chosen by the salesperson directly
affects the fraction of customers who belong to Segment A.
Specifically, a given level of prospecting quality, <[), gives
rise to a situation in which N <|) of the N customers called on
belong to Segment A. The remaining N(l - <|)) customers
belong to Segment B.
Information Structure
In my research, I preserve the key notion that the salesper-
son possesses superior information about customers' will-
ingness to pay. I further assume that upon visiting the
prospect, the salesperson is able to identify precisely the
reservation value of the customer and thus sets price equal
to that reservation value.^ If the firm has a policy whereby
the price must be above a certain floor (limited pricing
authority case) and this floor exceeds the reservation value
of the customer, the sale is not closed.
It is important to recognize that even though the firm is
able to observe the price paid by each customer, it cannot
infer the quality of the prospecting strategy and therefore the
amount of effort devoted to prospecting. This is because the
overlap in reservation prices between the two segments does
not allow inferences to be made about the effort invested in
prospecting. For example, if the salesperson obtains a price
in the interval [1 - 8, 8], the firm cannot tell whether the
salesperson worked hard to identify a Segment A customer
or was simply lucky in obtaining a Segment B customer
with a relatively high reservation value. In general, a given
mix of N customers with realized prices coming from the
three intervals—[0, 1 - 8], [ 1 - 8, 1 ], and [ 1, 2 - 8]—can be
generated by several values of (j). Because of this, observed
prices are at best an imperfect signal for the level of effort
devoted to prospecting."*
Compensation Plan
Consistent with the research context, it is assumed that the
salesperson is compensated on a linear commission rate, B,




As specified by Srinivasan (1981) and Basu and colleagues
(1985), it is assumed that the salesperson is a utility-maxi-
mizer. The overall level of utility enjoyed by the salesperson
consists of compensation less the cost of effort, which may
now be written as
(3) U = S - N A<t)2 = Bx - N ^<t
2 2
^Again, considerations of negotiation, bargaining, and so forth
are excluded because these forces are outside the scope of the
model.
'*ln theory, it is possible to contract on the distribution of realized
prices and improve contracting efficiency. However, I do not con-
sider such schemes because they are never observed in practice. In
the industry analyzed by Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier (1979), for
example, commissions are based simply on gross margins.
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The utility function described in Equation 3 assumes that the
salesperson is risk neutral. In essence, issues of risk and risk
sharing are not included in the analysis because Berger
(1972) and Weinberg (1975) have already investigated the
impact of salesperson risk aversion on price delegation.
Analysis
The analysis of the model is divided into three main parts.
First, the profits of the firm are derived under full pricing
authority. Second, the profits of the firm are derived under
limited pricing authority. Third, firm profits under the two
cases are compared and conditions are described in which
each pricing strategy is optimal.
Profits Under Full Pricing Authority
In this scenario, the firm gives the salesperson full pricing
authority, and control is effected solely through the com-
pensation plan. The timing of efforts is sequential and is
described as follows: The salesperson first prospects for
customers with a quality level <|). This yields N (j) customers
who belong to Segment A and N(l - (|)) customers who
belong to Segment B. These N customers are then contacted
and engaged in face-to-face communication.
Given a commission rate, B, the salesperson maximizes
the following utility function:
First-order conditions yield
(4) BN<t, BN(1 - <1,)1 - N | (
In Equation 4, the first term represents commission income
obtained from sales to the Ncj) customers in Segment A.
Because the salesperson has full pricing authority, each of
these transactions can be closed successfully. Moreover, the
expected price obtained from these customers is simply the
mean of the distribution of their reservation values, namely,
(3 - 28)/2. The second term represents commission income
from the N(l - ([)) customers in Segment B. As discussed
previously, the salesperson can consummate the sale with
each of these customers. Here, the expected price obtained
is 1/2. Finally, the last term represents the disutility for
effort. First-order conditions yield
(5)
B(l - 8)
Next, knowing the salesperson's response to a given
commission rate, B, the firm chooses a commission rate that
maximizes its profits. The firm's profit is the level of gross
margins generated by the salesperson less commisions.
Using Equation 5 and assuming zero marginal costs, the




B(l - S) 3 - 25
+ (1 - B)N 1 -
B(l - 5)1 1
Equation 6 can be simplified to
(7)
(8) 1 I
4 (1 - 5)2
Equation 8 reveals that the optimal commission rate
decreases in the parameter that reflects the cost of effort, X,
as well as the overlap parameter, 8. As X increases, it
becomes more costly to induce effort through incentives;
consequently, the firm finds it less attractive to use incen-
tives. Similarly, as 8 increases, the two segments become
less distinct and prospecting becomes less valuable; conse-
quently, the firm again relies on incentives to a lesser extent.
Finally, using Equations 7 and 8, the firm's expected
profits, E[jt], may now be written as
(9)
_, , 1 N(l - 5)2 NX N
Ef 7i] = i — + + —
4 X 16(1-5)2 4
Overall, the analysis here reveals that providing the salesper-
son with full pricing authority provides an important benefit,
namely, the ability to match price to customer willingness to
pay and thereby successfully complete all the N transactions.
Profits Under Limited Pricing Authority
As in the previous scenario, in which the salesperson has
full pricing authority, the efforts are sequential in that
prospecting is followed by face-to-face communication. In
this situation, however, the firm yields only limited pricing
authority in that the salesperson can discount only up to a
predetermined floor. Theoretically, this fioor can lie any-
where in the interval [0, 2 - 8]. However, in the Appendix,
it is shown that the firm will never choose to set a fioor
greater than 1 - 8, the lowest reservation value possessed by
a customer in Segment A. Consequently, the following
equation assumes a price fioor that, at most, takes the value
1 - 8. Denoting this price fioor by a,5 the salesperson max-
imizes the following utility function:
(10) BN(t) + BN(1 - (t))(l - a) - N - (
In Equation 10, the first term represents the salesperson's
commission income obtained from sales to customers in
Segment A. Note that because the price fioor is < 1 - 8, the
salesperson can conclude sales with all N(^ customers in this
segment. The second term represents commission income
obtained from customers in Segment B. Here, given the
price fioor a, the salesperson can conclude sales with only
(1 - a) fraction of these N(l - <|)) customers; some cus-
tomers will not buy the product because it exceeds their
willingness to pay. Moroever, the expected price obtained
from these customers is (1 + a)/2. Finally, the third term rep-
resents the disutility for effort. First-order conditions yield
(II)
•''Note that a = 0 corresponds to the full pricing authority case.
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Comparing Equation 11 with Equation 5 reveals a key
benefit of limiting pricing authority. Specifically, limiting
pricing authority forces the salesperson to increase the qual-
ity of prospecting (1 - 8 + .5a2 > 1 - 8 for all a > 0). In
effect, the lack of pricing fiexibility causes the salesperson
to realize that poor prospecting cannot be offset by price
discounting; consequently, the salesperson expends greater
effort on prospecting.
As previously, knowing the salesperson's response to a
given price fioor and commission rate, the firm chooses the
optimal values of these variables. From Equation 11, the
firm's problem may be written formally as
(12)
Max
a,B ( l -B)N-
- 5 + .5a2) 3 - 2 5
(I - B)N
r _ B(l - 5 + .5a2)1
( 1 - a ) -
First-order conditions yield
(13) B = - -
As in the case of full pricing authority. Equation 13 reveals
that the optimal commission rate decreases in the parameter
that refiects the cost of effort, X, as well as the overlap para-
meter, 8. In addition. Equation 13 reveals that the level of
incentives increases as the price fioor, a, increases. In other
words, at the optimum, restricting the salesperson's freedom
with respect to pricing should be accompanied by an increase
in the commission rate. This finding forms the basis for P2,
which is discussed in greater detail in the Findings section.
From Equations 12 and 13, the firm's expected profits




are not very tractable, I use numerical techniques. More-
over, because both profit functions include the term N, it is
appropriate to restrict the evaluation of firm profits to the
X-5 parameter space. The parameter X has no natural lim-
its; nevertheless, the interval [0, 1] is found to be sufficient
to present findings of interest. The parameter 8, in contrast,
represents the overlap in the segmentation scheme. As such,
it will be some positive number significantly less than 1. For
the purposes of this research, the interval [0, .10] is found to
be sufficient to present findings of interest. The key results
are displayed in Figure 2 and discussed in the next section.
Findings
I summarize the main findings in terms of two key proposi-
tions. Pi demonstrates that the optimality of delegating pric-
ing authority varies across the parameter space. P2 demon-
strates how the commission rate varies with the price
delegation decision.
P|: Full price delegation is not optimal in all parts of the
parameter space. Specifically, for a given value of the
overlap parameter, 5, the optimality of full price delega-
tion varies nonmonotonically with the effort cost of fol-
lowing a high-quality prospecting strategy, X. In particu-
lar, when X is relatively low or relatively high, full price
delegation is the optimal strategy. However, when X takes
on intermediate values, limited price delegation is the
optimal strategy.
Figure 2 reveals that the parameter space splits into four
distinct regions. In Region I, the cost of following a high-
quality prospecting strategy is relatively low. Consequently,
the optimal commission rate under full pricing authority is
such that it induces the salesperson to follow a high-quality
prospecting strategy (i.e., induces <]) = 1). As such, there is
no cost to granting full pricing authority to the salesperson
FIGURE 2
Optimality of Price Delegation
Overall, the analysis here reveals that the benefit of limiting
pricing authority is that it forces the salesperson to exert
greater effort on prospecting. However, a limitation of this
strategy is that some sales transactions are not completed
because price exceeds the customer's reservation value. Thus,
it is not obvious how limited pricing authority will compare
with full pricing authority. TTierefore, the profits across the two
scenarios will be analyzed next for the sake of comparison.
Optimality of Price Delegation
As suggested in the previous subsection, I compare Equa-
tions 9 and 14 to describe the optimal level of price delega-
tion.^ Because the analytical expressions in these equations
*ln comparing Equations 9 and 14, the parameters are varied in
the following fashion: X in steps of .1, 5 in steps of .025, and a in
steps of .01. At each X-8 point, the profit in Equation 9 is com-
pared with the profit in Equation 14 using a value of a E [0, 1 - 5]
. that maximizes Equation 14. If Equation 9 has a larger value than
Equation 14, then full pricing authority is the optimal strategy;
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because the opportunity to make suboptimal trade-offs
between effort and price does not arise in the first place.
In Region II, the optimal commission rate under full
pricing authority is such that it induces less-than-full atten-
tion to prospecting ((|)< I). Therefore, as is concluded in the
discussion following Equation 11, limiting pricing authority
will increase the effort devoted to prospecting. Neverthe-
less, in this region, limiting pricing authority is not prof-
itable because the level of effort induced by the commission
rate under full pricing authority is close to ideal (recall that
X is still relatively low in this region). Thus, although limit-
ing pricing authority can increase 0, the incremental gain is
not worth the loss in sales arising from the lack of pricing
fiexibility.
Next, in Region III, the optimal solution is indeed to
limit pricing authority. Here, X takes on an intermediate
value; consequently, the effort induced by incentives under
full pricing authority is relatively low. Thus, in this region,
limiting pricing authority has the potential to increase the
effort devoted to prospecting substantially.^ Unlike in
Region II, this improvement in effort is accompanied by an
improvement in firm profits as well. In effect, limiting pric-
ing authority forces the salesperson to target high-valuation
customers, and this benefit exceeds the loss in sales arising
from the lack of pricing fiexibility.
Finally, in Region IV, the optimal strategy is again to
resort to full pricing authority. In this region, the effort cost
of following a high-quality prospecting strategy is relatively
high; consequently, forcing more attention on prospecting
by limiting pricing authority is simply not cost effective.
P2: In the region where limiting pricing authority is the optimal
strategy, the commission rate offered to the salesperson
under limited pricing authority is higher than the corre-
sponding commission rate offered to the salesperson under
full pricing authority.
P2 demonstrates that a firm making the transition from
full pricing authority to limited pricing authority also needs
to increase the commission rate offered to the salesperson.
Intuitively, this is because limiting pricing authority
enhances the effectiveness of commissions in inducing
effort; consequently, the firm prefers to use incentives to a
greater extent. P2 is interesting because it is counterintuitive.
Limiting the salesperson's freedom with respect to pricing
would be expected to be accompanied by a relaxation in the
emphasis placed on the other element of the control system,
namely, the commission rate. In contrast, according to the
model, limiting pricing authority increases the emphasis that
needs to be placed on commissions.
•'Three points may be of interest to the technically oriented
reader. First, when the overlap parameter, 5, exceeds .17, Region
III vanishes altogether and full pricing authority is always the opti-
mal solution. Intuitively, as 5 increases, the two segments become
less distinct and the need for prospecting decreases. This, in turn,
eliminates the need for inducing greater effort through a strategy of
limited pricing authority. Second, the optimal price fioor (a) in
most of Region III is either equal to or close to 1 - 5. Third, the rel-
atively small area captured by Region III does not imply that this
solution will occur infrequently in practice.
Discussion and iVIanageriai
Implications
In this research, I develop and analyze a model that formally
examines the optimality of delegating pricing authority to
the sales force. I find that there are environments in which
full price delegation is the optimal course of action and oth-
ers in which limited price delegation is the best strategy. As
mentioned previously, this is an important theoretical find-
ing because it has the potential to reconcile the confiicting
empirical evidence reported in the literature with respect to
the decision to delegate pricing authority.
An appealing feature of my model is that it explicitly
incorporates the general complaint that price delegation
causes salespeople to reduce their selling efforts. Specifi-
cally, the analysis reveals that giving salespeople full pric-
ing authority may lead to situations in which salespeople use
discounts to garner sales rather than expend effort to pursue
customers who value the product highly. Thus, in some sit-
uations, it makes sense for the firm to limit pricing author-
ity even though the salesperson has superior information
about customer willingness to pay. Moreover, the analysis
also reveals that limiting the amount of pricing authority and
increasing the commission rate combine synergistically to
ensure that the salesperson indeed vigorously pursues these
customers. This combination of control elements is counter-
intuitive. Intuition would suggest that the commission rate
should be higher when the salesperson has greater latitude
with respect to pricing.
I summarize the context, calculus, arid main implications
of the model in Table 1 with a view to assisting sales man-
agers charged with the price-delegation decision. Hopefully,
the context described by the model is not overly restrictive
and many sales organizations will find the essential features
relevant. However, practitioners need to be alerted that sev-
eral other factors, such as those highlighted by Stephenson,
Cron, and Frazier (1979), will also play a role in determining
the optimality of the price-delegation decision. Nevertheless,
the model succinctly describes the net impact of two forces
that pertain to the price-delegation decision, namely, superior
salesperson information about customer willingness to pay
and suboptimal effort-price tradeoff. As such, it should
prove useful to managers charged with the price-delegation
decision.
In the future, it is likely that the importance of price cus-
tomization will increase as sales organizations use informa-
tion-age technology to reach more diverse markets. Thus, it
is likely that the questions of whether pricing authority
should be granted to salespeople and, if so, how much
authority is granted will continue to be of interest to acade-
micians and practitioners alike. The present study should
stimulate additional research, especially on the empirical
side, that will deepen the understanding of price delegation
in sales organizations.
Appendix
Here, I show that the firm will never find it profitable to set
a price floor above 1 - 8. To understand this, consider the
following: Suppose the firm sets a price fioor that is greater
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TABLE 1
Model Context, Calculus, and Implications
Model Context
The model is set in selling environments in which
•Customers vary widely in their valuations of the firm's
offering;
•Prospecting, that is, identifying customers with high
valuations, is a significant component of the selling task;
and
•Commissions based on gross margins serve as an
important control element.
Model Calculus
Limiting pricing authority can serve as an additional control
element; it provides an important benefit but comes at a cost:
•Benefit: forces the salesperson to devote greater attention
to prospecting because the ability to close sales by
discounting has been curtailed.
•Cost: prevents the salesperson from matching price to
















Because the effort cost of following a high-quality prospecting
strategy is relatively low, commissions alone can ensure
sufficient attention to prospecting. In addition, full pricing
authority provides salespeople the ability to conclude a greater
fraction of transactions.
Limiting pricing authority forces greater attention to prospecting
because the ability to discount price has been curtailed. In
addition, increased reliance on commissions reinforces the
importance of targeting high-valuation customers.
Because the effort cost of following a high-quality prospecting
strategy is relatively high, it is not cost effective to induce more
effort on prospecting by limiting pricing authority. The firm gains
more by giving the salespeople pricing freedom so that they
conclude a greater fraction of transactions.
than 1 - 8 but less than 1. Denoting this price floor by 1 -
5 + A, the salesperson's problem is given by
(Al)
BN(1 - - A) - Ny
In Equation Al, the first term represents sales from cus-
tomers in Segment A. With a price floor of 1 - 5 -H A, the
expected price is (3 - 25 + A)/2, and the salesperson can
conclude sales with (1 - A) fraction of customers in Seg-
ment A. The second term represents sales from customers in
Segment B. For these customers, the expected price is (2 -
5 + A)/2, and the salesperson can conclude sales with (8 - A)
fraction of these customers. First-order conditions yield
Equation A2 reveals that the level of effort induced is indepen-
dent of A. In other words, the effort that is induced is constant
for all a e [1 - 8, 1]. However, setting a price floor in this
interval is costly because it will exclude some customers. Thus,
the firm will never find it profitable to set such a price floor.
Finally, a little' thought will show that the firm will not
want to set a price fioor greater than 1 either. In effect, set-
ting a floor above this level simply excludes customers that
the salesperson should be calling on in the first place,
namely, the firm's target segment.
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